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Abstract:  This paper investigates potential market forces that cause payment card 
rewards even when providing payment card rewards is not the most efficient. Three 
factors—oligopolistic merchants, output-maximizing card networks, and the merchant’s 
inability to set different prices across payment methods—may potentially explain the 
prevalence of payment card rewards programs in the United States today.  The paper also 
points out that competition among card networks may potentially make payment rewards 
too generous, and thus deteriorate social welfare and its distribution. The situation may 
potentially warrant public policy interventions.  
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1.  Introduction 
Payment card rewards programs have become increasingly popular in the United States. 
However, providing payment card rewards may not be necessarily beneficial to consumers and 
society as a whole.  According to the theoretical literature on payment card fee structure, in most 
cases the most efficient cardholder fees would be the difference between the card network’s costs 
for a card transaction and the merchant’s transactional benefit from the card transaction. 
Available empirical evidence suggests that in the United States the merchant’s transactional 
benefit from a card transaction may not exceed the card network’s cost. This implies providing 
rewards would unlikely be the most efficient. What drives payment card rewards?  
This paper is the second of a series of three papers. The first paper examined the optimal 
balance between the merchant fee and the cardholder fee from both efficiency and equity 
perspectives.
2
The equilibrium card fee structure is greatly influenced by many factors. This paper 
examines the equilibrium fee structure under various combinations of assumptions and identifies 
what factors potentially cause payment card rewards. We also consider the welfare consequences 
of equilibrium card fee structures. The results suggest three factors that together may explain the 
prevalence of rewards card programs in the United States today.  They are oligopolistic 
merchants, output-maximizing card networks and the merchant’s inability to set different prices 
according to their customers’ payment methods. Whether per transaction costs and fees are fixed 
 In this paper, we investigate what market forces drive payment card rewards. The 
results are useful for policymakers when determining whether the current situation should call 
for public policy interventions and if so what policies are appropriate.  Policy options are 
considered in the third paper.    
                                                 
2 Hayashi  (2008).    3 
or proportional to the transaction value may also play an important role in determining the level 
of rewards. When per transaction costs and fees are proportional and the three factors mentioned 
above co-exist, competition among card networks would likely increase the level of rewards as 
well as the merchant fees. The higher merchant fees would result in the higher product prices, 
and as a result the equilibrium social welfare would be potentially lower than the social welfare 
without cards at all. Although the previous studies suggested competition in a two-sided market 
may not necessarily improve efficiency, the finding in this paper—competition in a two-sided 
market may potentially deteriorate efficiency—is new in the literature and has a potentially 
important public policy implication.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 constructs theoretical models.  
Section 3 examines the market equilibrium—fee structures and their welfare consequences for 
different parties that are involved in payment card markets. Section 4 concludes.  
2.  Models 
We use the models that were constructed in the first paper (Hayashi, 2008) as the base 
models here.  We also make additional assumptions regarding merchants and card networks, 
which greatly affect equilibrium fee structure. This section first recaps our base models then 
makes additional assumptions regarding merchants and card networks.  
2.1 Recap of the Base Models 
The assumptions common to all models are the following. The payment card markets are 
considered to be matured. All consumers hold at least one card and merchants accept cards as 
long as the merchant fees are lower than a certain threshold level, which is endogenously 
determined.     4 
Consumers are heterogeneous in their transactional benefit from cards as opposed to the 
alternative payments. A consumer’s transactional benefit from a card,  B b , consists of three parts. 
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Consumers pay the cardholder fee of  f  when they use a card.      
Merchants are homogeneous (at least ex-ante) and their transactional benefit from cards, 
S b ˆ , is defined as the merchant cost for the alternative payment method, 
A
S c , plus the merchant 
fee paid for the alternative payment method, 
A m  , minus the merchant cost for a card transaction, 
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S c . Merchants pay the 
merchant fee of m when their customers use a card.  Merchants also incur a cost of selling one 
unit of goods, d .  
The assumptions in terms of (i) per transaction costs and fees; (ii) consumer demand for 
goods; and (iii) merchant ability to set different prices according to the payment method can 
vary. Per transaction costs and fees are either flat or proportional to the transaction value. 
Consumer demand for goods is either inelastic (i.e., a consumer makes a fixed number of 
transactions) or downward-sloping (i.e., the number of transactions increases as the effective 
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price of goods decreases).  A merchant either sets the same price for all of its customers 
regardless of the payment method or sets the different prices according to the payment method 
its customers use.      
2.2 Additional Assumptions 
Thus, oligopolistic merchants are more realistic. This paper assumes ologopolistic 
merchants compete according to the Hotelling model. Although the other models, such as the 
Cournot model, can be used to describe oligopolistic merchants, the Hotelling model is more 
flexible.
Merchants   
Although some merchants are possibly monopolistic, many U.S. merchants are 
considered to be quite competitive. However, a perfectly competitive market described as the 
Bertrand competition unlikely reflects the reality.  At equilibrium under the Bertrand 
competition, two types of merchants—cash-only merchants and card-accepting merchants—
serve the customers separately, and because of the higher price set by card-accepting merchants, 
only card-using consumers make transactions at the card-accepting merchants. In reality, 
however, most card-accepting merchants serve both card-using customers and non-card-using 
consumers. 
5
The basic framework of the Hotelling model is the following:  There are two merchants, 
Merchant A and Merchant B. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval of [0, 1], 
which is independent of their transactional benefit from cards. Merchant A is located at point 0 
and Merchant B is located at point 1. For the consumers located at point 
  
x, where  1 0 ≤ ≤ x , the 
transportation cost to Merchant A is tx, and the transportation cost to Merchant B is  ) 1 ( x t − . A 
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consumer located at point  x with transactional benefit from cards  B b  chooses a merchant and a 
payment method, which gives the consumer the lower effective price plus transportation costs.  
For example, suppose a monopoly card network provides the card services, only Merchant A 
accepts the cards, and Merchant A sets an identical price A p  for both card-using consumers and 
non-card-using consumers. Merchant B sets price  B p  for their customers.  Then, the consumer’s 
effective price plus transportation cost is  tx b f p B A + − + , when he purchases goods at Merchant 
A with a card,  tx pA + ,  when he purchases goods at Merchant A with an alternative payment 
method, and  ) 1 ( x t pB − + , when he purchases goods at Merchant B.  Suppose  f bB ≥ . The 
consumer chooses a card at Merchant A, and therefore, he compares  tx b f p B A + − +  and 
) 1 ( x t pB − + . If   ) 1 ( x t p tx b f p B B A − + > + − + , then he purchases goods at Merchant B with 
an alternative payment method, otherwise he purchases goods at Merchant A with a card. 
 
This paper assumes the card network sets both cardholder fees (rewards) and merchant 
fees. Although, in reality, four-party scheme card networks do not directly set merchant fees, 
assuming a card network sets its merchant fees is not too far from the reality because a major 
part of the merchant fee (70-80 percent) is an interchange fee, almost all acquirers entirely pass 
through the interchange fee to merchants, and the acquirers’ charges to merchants in addition to 
the interchange fees seem not to vary very much within an industry. In contrast, assuming a card 
network (four-party scheme) sets its cardholder fees may appear to be unrealistic.  Cardholder 
fees, especially credit card rewards, vary by card issuers: Large card issuers tend to provide more 
generous rewards than their smaller counterparts. However, about 80 percent of the total four-
party scheme credit cards are issued by the top 10 card issuers. Although it is difficult to 
Card networks      7 
compare the level of rewards among the top 10 issuers, if, as card networks and their issuers 
claim, they compete vigorously in the consumer-side of the payment card market, then the level 
of rewards should be very close to the difference between the interchange fees and the issuer’s 
costs of processing a card transaction. Again, card issuers’ costs of processing a card transaction 
vary. But if the top 10 issuers’ costs of processing a card transaction are similar, then the 
interchange fees set by a card network greatly influence the level of rewards on the cards issued 
by the top 10 issuers.  
There is a variety of assumptions about the objective of payment card networks, but the 
objective can be abstracted as either profit- or output-maximization. Profit-maximization is 
obvious, but output-maximization may not be.  When card networks compete, each card network 
may reduce its markup to undercut its’ rival card networks until the markup reaches the 
reservation markup. And the reservation markup may potentially be very close to zero. In such a 
case, card networks likely aim to increase their market share as much as possible. Even when 
card networks are monopolistic (potentially collude), their objective can be output-maximization. 
In a four-party scheme card network, it is possible that each acquirer and issuer gets a small fixed 
markup. Typically, an acquirer’s markup is small, and because of the intensified competition 
among issuers, each issuer may get a small markup even when the card network they join is 
monopolistic.  
  Competitive card networks’ behavior is likely affected by their cardholders’ homing 
behavior.  When a cardholder holds only a single-branded card or has a strong preference among 
cards (singlehoming), then each card network can set monopolistic merchant fees. In contrast, if 
all cardholders hold multiple cards and they are indifferent among those cards (multihoming), 
then card networks cannot set monopolistic merchant fees, because merchants may influence   8 
their customers’ choice of payment methods. In the model, we assume that singlehoming 
cardholders are not sensitive to rewards when deciding which card to use, while multihoming 
cardholders are very sensitive to rewards and they always choose a card with the highest level of 
rewards among the cards the merchant accepts.   
In this paper, three types of card networks are considered: (i) profit-maximizing 
monopoly, (ii) output-maximizing monopoly, and (iii) output-maximizing competing networks 
with cardholders who are all multihoming. Although we do not explicitly consider the case of 
output-maximizing competing networks with some singlehoming cardholders, the results would 
be somewhere between those of an output-maximizing monopoly network and those of output-
maximizing duopoly networks with cardholders who are all multihoming.
6
3.  Market Equilibrium 
   
Hayashi (2008) examined the most efficient fee structure under various combinations of the 
assumptions. In most cases, the most efficient cardholder fee is the difference between the card 
network’s costs for a payment card transaction and the merchant transactional benefit from the 
card transaction. This implies that unless the merchant transactional benefit from a card exceeds 
the card network’s costs of processing a card transaction, providing payment card rewards to 
consumers is less efficient. According to the available cost studies in the United States, the 
merchant transactional benefit from a card may not be higher than the card network’s costs.
7
This section examines the equilibrium fee structures and their influence on the welfare of 
different parties, such as card-using consumers, non-card-using consumers, merchants, and 
 
Nevertheless, payment card rewards programs are prevalent in the United States.  
                                                 
6 Output-maximizing networks may have a positive reservation markup per transaction; however, this section 
assumes the markup is zero (i.e., the profit of output-maximizing network is zero) for simplicity. 
7 These cost studies are Garcia-Swartz et. al. (2006), Food Marketing Institute (1998), and Star Network (2006, 
2007). See also Hayashi (2008) for more detailed discussion.     9 
payment card networks (and their member financial institutions). The main purpose of this 
exercise is to find out what market forces may potentially drive payment card rewards. The 
results may also be useful for public policy consideration: For example, does encouraging 
competition among card networks reduce the level of payment card rewards? Does regulatory 
intervention that abolishes the no-surcharge rules improve social welfare?  
This section looks at four factors that may significantly affect the equilibrium fee 
structures. The first factor is competition among card networks and their objectives. As 
mentioned above three types of card networks are considered.  
The second factor is consumer demand for goods. Consumer demand for goods is assumed 
to be either inelastic or downward-sloping. When a consumer’s demand for good is inelastic, the 
consumer would make a fixed number of transactions regardless of the price of goods or fees 
charged for each transaction. When a consumer’s demand for goods increases as the effective 
price of goods (i.e., sum of the price of goods and the cardholder fee per transaction) decreases, 
the consumer would make more transactions as the effective price of goods decreases. 
     The third factor relates to per transaction costs and fees for given payment methods. Per 
transaction costs and fees are assumed to be either fixed regardless of the transaction value or 
proportional to the transaction value. Many previous studies assumed that per transaction costs 
and fees are fixed. In reality, however, especially in the United States, merchants pay 
proportional fees for card transactions and consumers receive rewards that are proportional to the 
purchase value.  According to the available cost studies, costs of handling a cash transaction and 
a credit card transaction increase as the transaction value increases.      
Finally, the fourth factor is about the merchant’s ability to set different prices according to 
their customers’ payment methods. Currently in the United States, most merchants set the same   10 
price for all of their customers regardless of their payment methods. But in the other countries, 
such as Australia and Netherlands, many merchants set different prices according to their 
customers’ payment methods. The difference between these countries and the United States is 
caused by card networks’ rules.  In the United States, major card networks have a rule that does 
not allow merchants to (or makes merchants difficult) set different prices according to payment 
methods, while in Australia or Netherlands they do not.  Especially in Australia, the Reserve 
Bank of Australia prohibits the card networks from imposing such a rule.  
This section first considers the case where merchants set the same price for all of their 
customers regardless of their payment methods (no-discriminatory pricing). There are four 
possible scenarios depending on the assumptions regarding consumer demand and per 
transaction costs and fees. The first scenario is where consumer demand is fixed and per 
transaction costs and fees are fixed (Scenario I). The second scenario is where consumer demand 
is fixed but per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value (Scenario II).  
The third scenario is where a consumer demand function is downward-sloping and per 
transaction costs and fees are fixed (Scenario III).  And the fourth scenario is where a consumer 
demand function is downward-sloping and per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the 
transaction value (Scenario IV).  Except for Scenario I, analytical solutions for equilibrium fee 
structure cannot be obtained. For Scenarios II and III, numerical examples can be used to 
characterize the equilibrium fee structure. Therefore, this section only considers Scenarios I, II 
and III.  In each scenario, three types of card networks—(i) profit-maximizing monopoly, (ii) 
output-maximizing monopoly, and (iii) output-maximizing competing networks with cardholders 
who are all multihoming—are considered.   11 
This section then considers the case where merchants set the different prices according to 
their customers’ payment methods (discriminatory pricing).  Similar to the case of non-
discriminatory pricing, analytical solution is obtainable only for Scenario I.  Numerical examples 
can be used for Scenario II.  Thus, only two scenarios are considered in this case.  
Because tedious calculations are required to obtain market equilibrium fee structures under 
various combinations of assumptions, the below summarizes the results.  Detailed calculations 
are in the Appendix. 
3.1 Market Equilibrium under No-discriminatory Pricing 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the equilibrium fee structure and the welfare consequences, 
respectively, when merchants set the same price for card-using consumers and consumers who 
use an alternative payment method. There are several key observations. 
First, in all three scenarios, a profit-maximizing monopoly network would set the most 
efficient cardholder fees.  This implies that if providing rewards to card-using consumers is not 
the most efficient, then the profit-maximizing monopoly network would not provide rewards.  
However, this does not necessarily imply that social welfare is maximized under a profit-
maximizing card network.  Except for Scenario I, social welfare is also affected by the product 
price, which is affected by the merchant fee. The merchant fee set by the profit-maximizing 
monopoly network is higher than the merchant’s transactional benefit from cards, which implies 
the merchant fee is not necessarily at the most efficient level. As a result, with profit-maximizing 
monopoly network(s), social welfare may not be reached at the maximum level (except for 
Scenario I).  
Second, in all three scenarios, an output-maximizing monopoly network would set 
cardholder fees lower than the most efficient cardholder fees.  This implies that even when   12 
providing rewards is not the most efficient, the output-maximizing monopoly network would 
likely provide rewards to card-using consumers.  Because the highest merchant fee the monopoly 
network can set increases as the cardholder fee decreases (or the level of rewards increases), the 
merchant fee set by the output-maximizing monopoly network is higher than that set by the 
profit-maximizing monopoly network.  As a result, the equilibrium product prices set under the 
output-maximizing monopoly network are higher than those set under the profit-maximizing 
monopoly network. Social welfare under the output-maximizing monopoly network is also lower 
than that under the profit-maximizing monopoly network. 
Third, whether competing card networks would set their cardholder fees at the most 
efficient level depends on two factors. One is cardholders’ homing behavior and the other is the 
nature of per transaction costs and fees.  When all cardholders are singlehoming (either they have 
only one card or they have a strong preference and cardholder fees do not affect their card 
choice), competing card networks can act like an output-maximizing monopoly network.  When 
all cardholders are multihoming (i.e., they have multiple networks’ cards and are indifferent 
among cards as long as the cardholder fees are the same), the equilibrium cardholder fee depends 
on whether per transaction costs and fees are fixed (Scenario I) or proportional to the transaction 
value (Scenario II).  If the former is the case, the competing card networks would set their 
cardholder fee at the most efficient level and their merchant fee at the merchant’s transactional 
benefit. This is because oligopolistically competing merchants would only accept the cards with 
the lower merchant fee.  If the latter is the case, the competing card networks would set their 
cardholder fees as low as possible. As a result, the merchant fees can be higher than the fees set 
by monopoly card networks. In this case, two types of merchants would co-exist ex-post: One 
type of merchants would accept the cards with the lower merchant fee only, while the other type   13 
of merchants would accept both networks’ cards. In fact, the card network with the higher 
merchant fee (thus the lower cardholder fees) would have more transactions than its rival card 
network. Knowing at least some merchants would accept both cards, card networks would not 
lower their merchant fees. Rather, they would raise merchant fees and lower cardholder fees in 
order to increase their card transactions.
8
                                                 
8 The card network can increase its merchant fee until one type of merchants would become more profitable by 
rejecting both cards than rejecting the cards with the higher merchant fees, given the other type of merchants would 
accept both networks’ cards.   
 Thus, competition among card networks would likely 
increase the equilibrium merchant fee and the level of payment card rewards.   
Fourth, related to the previous observations, whether per transaction costs and fees are 
fixed (Scenario I and III) or proportional to the transaction value (Scenario II) would 
significantly affect social welfare. If the former is the case, social welfare with cards is always at 
least the same as social welfare without cards.  While merchant profits are not affected by 
competition among card networks and their objectives, the surplus of consumers as a whole is 
higher when card networks are competing (Scenario I).  In contrast, if the latter is the case 
(Scenario II), social welfare with cards is not always higher than or the same as social welfare 
without cards. Social welfare under profit-maximizing monopoly network is always higher than 
social welfare without cards, while social welfare under output-maximizing monopoly or 
competitive card networks could be higher or lower than social welfare without cards. It depends 
on factors, such as card networks’ costs of processing a card transaction, merchants’ 
transactional benefit from cards, and consumers’ transactional benefits from cards. Consumer 
surplus could be higher under output-maximizing card networks than under profit-maximizing 
card networks. Network competition may improve merchant surplus but it does not improve 
consumer surplus; rather in some cases it deteriorates consumer surplus.           14 
 3.2 Market Equilibrium under Discriminatory Pricing 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the equilibrium fee structure and the welfare consequences, 
respectively, when merchants set different prices for card-using consumers and consumers who 
use an alternative payment method. There are four key observations. 
First, under Scenario I, where per transaction costs and fees are fixed regardless of the 
transaction value, a card fee structure has no effect on the number of card transactions, rather the 
sum of the two fees—the merchant fee and cardholder fee—affects the number of card 
transaction.  
9
Second, competition among card networks would unlikely influence the equilibrium fee 
structure. Under Scenario I, since the sum of the two fees determines the number of card 
transactions, a card network that maximizes its output sets the sum of the two fees at the card 
network’s costs of processing a transaction, regardless of whether it is monopoly or competing.  
Competition would unlikely influence the equilibrium fee structure under Scenario II, either.  
Competing card networks would not set their merchant fees lower than the fee set by the output-
maximizing monopoly network because it would set its merchant fee as low as possible in the 
realistic range of the merchant fees.
 In this case, the card networks would not have an incentive to provide rewards. In 
contrast, under Scenario II, where per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the 
transaction value, a card fee structure still affects the number of card transactions.  It is likely 
that the lower the merchant fees the more the number of card transactions. Thus, a card network 
that maximizes its output would increase the cardholder fee rather than providing rewards to card 
users. Even a card network that maximizes its profit would increase the cardholder fee if more 
transactions are profitable than higher markups per transaction.  
10
                                                 
9 This is consistent with the neutrality of interchange fees found in Gans and Small (2000).  
10 See Appendix B. 
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Third, in contrast to the case where merchants set the same prices for all their customers, 
the fee structure set by a profit-maximizing monopoly network would not lead to the most 
efficient number of card transactions; rather, it leads to a fewer number of card transactions. The 
fee structure set by an output-maximizing card network would lead to the most efficient number 
of card transactions under Scenario I and it would lead the number of card transactions that is 
more efficient than that the number of card transactions with a profit-maximizing card network 
under Scenario II.   
Fourth, related to the third observation, social welfare is higher with output-maximizing 
networks than with a profit-maximizing monopoly network. Nevertheless, even a profit-
maximizing monopoly network improves social welfare from that without cards at all. This 
implies social welfare with cards is always higher than social welfare without cards.  
3.3 Factors that Drives Payment Card Rewards 
The observations in the previous subsections suggest three potential market forces that 
together may drive payment card rewards.  The first is oligopolistic merchants, the second is the 
merchant’s inability to set different prices across payment methods, and the third is output-
maximizing card network(s).  
As mentioned, merchants are unlikely perfectly competitive, but some merchants may be 
monopolistic at least locally. Having rewards at equilibrium with monopolistic merchants is 
possible but in rather limited circumstances.
11
                                                 
11 It is easy to show that providing rewards is unlikely to be at equilibrium when merchants are monopolistic and 
consumers make a fixed number of transactions. In this case, monopolistic merchants would not accept cards if the 
merchant fee exceeds their transactional benefit, and thus card networks cannot provide rewards without incurring 
losses. When a consumer’s demand function for goods is downward-sloping, the equilibrium cardholder fee may 
potentially be negative. In this case, monopolistic merchants would accept the cards even when the merchant fee 
exceeds their transactional benefit because accepting the cards may induce a consumer demand curve shift upwards.  
 In contrast, rewards can exist with oligopolistic 
merchants in much broader circumstances, as has been shown in the subsection 3.1.     16 
As has been shown in the subsection 3.2, when merchants set different prices according to 
their customers’ payment methods, card networks do not have an incentive to provide rewards 
(Scenario I) or card networks have an incentive to set their merchant fees as low as possible and 
thus, they set their cardholder fees higher (Scenario II). Therefore, if merchants are allowed to 
set different prices across payment methods and they actually do, then payment card rewards are 
less likely to exist at equilibrium.  
  Output-maximizing card networks are more likely to provide rewards than profit-
maximizing card networks.  When merchants are oligopolistic and set the same price regardless 
of their customers’ payment methods, a profit-maximizing monopoly card network would not set 
rewards level that is higher than the most efficient level, while an output-maximizing monopoly 
network or output-maximizing competing network would set rewards level that is higher than the 
most efficient level.     
The observations also suggest that the rewards level could be higher under competitive 
card networks and as a result, efficiency could be deteriorated in some circumstances.  The 
previous literature on two-sided markets suggests that competition in a two-sided market does 
not necessarily improve efficiency but few studies suggested that competition in a two-sided 
market may deteriorate efficiency.  In the context of the payment card market, Guthrie and 
Wright (2007) found that competition among payment card networks would not improve 
efficiency when all cardholders are singlehoming, while it would improve efficiency as more 
cardholders become multihoming. The results in this paper are consistent with their results 
because Guthrie and Wright assumed per transaction costs and fees are fixed.  However, when 
per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value, competition among card 
networks would not improve efficiency even if all cardholders are multihoming; rather, it would   17 
potentially deteriorate efficiency. In this sense, the paper makes a contribution to the literature by 
showing a potential negative effect of competition on efficiency in a two-sided market.        
4.  Conclusion 
This paper investigated what market forces drive payment card rewards, when providing 
rewards may not be the most efficient. The paper identified three factors that together may 
explain the prevalence of rewards programs in the United States today.  They are output-
maximizing card networks, oligopolistic merchants and the merchant’s inability to set different 
prices across payment methods. Existence of these three factors in the U.S. payment card market 
is quite plausible. Although whether per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the 
transaction value is an empirical question, the theoretical models suggest that when per 
transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value, the equilibrium social welfare 
would potentially be lower than the social welfare without cards at all.  Consumers as a whole 
and merchants would be worse off, compared with the economy without cards at all.  This may 
warrant public policy interventions.  In this case, enhancing competition among card networks 
would not improve efficiency but would potentially deteriorate efficiency. The equilibrium fee 
structures and their welfare consequences may be useful for policymakers when they consider 
policy options.   
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Table 1: Equilibrium Fee Structure: No Discriminatory Pricing  
 
Scenario  Scenario I  
Type of network  Monopoly Network  Competitive Networks 
Objective  Profit-max  Output-max  Output-max 
Consumer homing  Single  Single  All multihoming 
Cardholder fee( f ) 
S b c ˆ −   ) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b c S B S − + − − or  B b   S b c ˆ −  
Merchant fee (m )  2 / ) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b S B S − + +   ) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b S B S − + +  or  2 / ) ( ˆ
B B S b b b − +    S b ˆ  
Card transactions  Efficient  More  Efficient 
 
Scenario  Scenario II 
Type of network  Monopoly Network  Competitive Networks 
Objective  Profit-max  Output-max  Output-max 
Consumer homing  Single  Single  Multihoming 
Cardholder fee( f ) 
S b c ˆ −   ε + − + − − ) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b c S B S  or  B b   B b  or higher 
Merchant fee (m ) 
2 / ) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b S B S − + +  
ε − − + + ) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b S B S  
 or  2 / ) ( ˆ
B B S b b b − +  
2 / ) ( ˆ
B B S b b b − +  or lower 
Card transactions  Efficient*  More  More 
 
Scenario  Scenario III  
Type of network  Monopoly Network  Competitive Networks 
Objective  Profit-max  Output-max  Output-max 
Consumer homing  Single  Single  All multihoming 
Cardholder fee( f ) 
S b c ˆ −   ε + − + − − ) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b c S B S  or  B b   
Not available  Merchant fee (m )  2 / ) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b S B S − + +   ε − − + + ) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b S B S  or  2 / ) ( ˆ
B B S b b b − +   
Card transactions  Efficient**  More 
Notes: *: The number of card transactions is at the most efficient level; however, due to a higher merchant fee, the equilibrium product price is higher than the 
most efficient product price.  Thus, the social welfare is not maximized at equilibrium. 
  **: The equilibrium fee structure results in the most efficient marginal card users; however, due to a higher merchant fee, the equilibrium product price is 
higher than the most efficient product price. Thus, the social welfare is not maximized at equilibrium.   21 
  
Table 2: Consumer, Merchant, and Network Surplus: No Discriminatory Pricing  
 
Scenario  Scenario I  
Type of network  Monopoly Network  Competitive Networks 
No-Card  Objective  Profit-max  Output-max  Output-max 
Consumer homing  Singlehoming  Singlehoming  Multihoming 
Social Welfare  2 / ) ˆ ( ~ 2h c b b S B − + + υ  
υ ~ or 
c b b b S B B − + + + ˆ 2 / ) ( ~ υ  
2 / ) ˆ ( ~ 2h c b b S B − + + υ   υ ~ 
Consumer Total  t − υ ~   t − υ ~   2 / ) ˆ ( ~ 2h c b b t S B − + + − υ   t − υ ~  
Cash user/ 
Marginal card user 
2 / ) ˆ ( ~ 2h c b b t S B − + − − υ
 
h b c b t S B
2 )} ˆ ( { 2 ~ − − − − υ  
or  2 / ) ( ~
B B b b t − − − υ  
t − υ ~   t − υ ~  
Card user w/  B b   ) ˆ (
2 / ) ˆ ( ~ 2
c b b




− + − − υ
 
h b c b
b b c b t
S B
B S B
2 )} ˆ ( { 2
) ˆ ( 2 ~
− − +
+ − − + − υ
 
or 
2 / ) ( ~
B B B b b b t + − + − υ  
c b b t S B − + + − ˆ ~ υ   Not applicable 
Merchant Total  t  t  t  t 
Network Total  2 / ) ˆ (
2h c b b S B − +  
0 or 
c b b b S B B − + + ˆ 2 / ) (  
0  0 
Notes:  ) /( 1 B B b b h − = .  S b d ˆ ~ − − =υ υ . 
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Table 2: Consumer, Merchant, and Network Surplus: No Discriminatory Pricing (Cont.) 
 
Scenario  Scenario II  
Type of network  Monopoly Network  Competitive Networks 
No-Card  Objective  Profit-max  Output-max  Output-max 
Consumer homing  Singlehoming  Singlehoming  Multihoming 
Social Welfare  Higher “No-card”  
Lower than “Monopoly, 
Profit-Max”; Higher or same 
as “No-card” 
Lower than or same as 
“Monopoly, Output-Max”; 










+ υ  
Consumer Total  Same as “No-card”   Higher than or same as 
“Monopoly, Profit-Max” 
Lower than or same as 
“Monopoly, Output-Max”; 






− − υ  
Cash user/ 
Marginal card user  Lower than “No-card” 
Lower or higher than 
“Monopoly, Profit-Max”; 
Lower than “No-card” 
Not applicable or Lower 
than “Monopoly, Output-






− − υ  
Card user w/  B b   Lower or higher than “No-
card” cash user 
Lower or higher than 
“Monopoly, Profit-Max” 
Lower or higher than 
“Monopoly, Output-Max”  Not applicable 
Merchant Total  Same as or lower than 
“No-card” 
Higher or lower than 
“Monopoly, Profit-Max”; 
Higher or lower than “No-
card”  
Lower than or same as 
“Monopoly, Output-Max”; 
Higher or lower than “No-
card”  
t bS) ˆ 1 ( −  
Network Total  Higher than “No-card” 
Lower than “Monopoly, 
Profit-Max”; Same as or 
higher than “No-card”  
Same as “No-card”  0 
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Table 2: Consumer, Merchant, and Network Surplus: No Discriminatory Pricing (Cont.) 
 
Scenario  Scenario III  
Type of network  Monopoly Network  Competitive Networks 
No-Card  Objective  Profit-max  Output-max  Output-max 
Consumer homing  Singlehoming  Singlehoming  Multihoming 
Social Welfare  Higher than “No-card” 
Higher than “No-card” but 
lower than “Monopoly 
Profit-Max” 
Not available 
} ~ 4 ~








Consumer Total  Slightly higher than “No-
card” 
Slightly higher than 
“Monopoly, Profit-Max”  } ~ 4 ) 2 ~ (
2 ~ 2 ~ {
2 2
2 2
a t t a





Marginal card user  Lower than “No-card”  Lower than “Monopoly, 
Profit-Max”  } ~ 4 ) 2 ~ (
2 ~ 2 ~ {
2 2
2 2
a t t a




Card user w/  B b   Lower or higher than “No-
card” cash user 
Lower or higher than 
“Monopoly, Profit-Max”  Not applicable 
Merchant Total  Slightly lower than “No-
card” 
About the same as 
“Monopoly, Profit-Max”  } 2 ~ 4 { 2
2 2 t a t bt − +  
Network Total  Higher than “No-card”  Same as “No-card”  0 
Note:  S b d b a a ˆ / ~ − − = . 
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Table 3: Equilibrium Fee Structure: Discriminatory Pricing  
 
Scenario  Scenario I  
Type of network  Monopoly Network  Competitive Networks 
Objective  Profit-max  Output-max  Output-max 
Consumer homing  Single  Single  All multihoming 
Marginal card user (
m
B b )  ) ( / )} ( 1 { ˆ m
B
m
B S b h b H b c − + −   S b c ˆ −  
Cardholder fee ( f ) 




B b h b H c − +   c 
Merchant fee (m ) 
Card transactions  Fewer  Efficient 
 
Scenario  Scenario II 
Type of network  Monopoly Network 
Objective  Profit-max  Output-max 
Consumer homing  Single  Single 
Marginal card user (
m
B b )  S
m
B b c b ˆ − >   Higher or lower than  S b c ˆ −  
Cardholder fee ( f )  can be higher than  B b   
or lower than  B b  
as high as possible 
Merchant fee (m )  Either as high as or as low as 
possible 
as low as possible  
(likely a negative fee) 
Card transactions  Fewer†  More or fewer† 
Notes: †: The number of card transactions is compared with the most efficient number of card transactions when product prices for card-using consumers and 
non-card-using consumers are the same. Thus, the number of card transactions is not necessarily the most efficient when merchants are allowed to set 
different prices for these two groups of consumers.     
  Equilibrium fee structure under Scenario III is not available.   
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Table 4: Consumer, Merchant, and Network Surplus: Discriminatory Pricing 
  
Type of merchants  Scenario I  
Type of network  Monopoly Network  Competitive Networks  No-Card  
Objective  Profit-max  Output-max  Output-max 
Consumer homing  Singlehoming  Singlehoming  Multihoming 
Social Welfare  8 / ) ˆ ( 3 ~ 2h c b b S B − + + υ   2 / ) ˆ ( ~ 2h c b b S B − + + υ   υ ~ 
Consumer Total  8 / ) ˆ ( ~ 2h c b b t S B − + + − υ   2 / ) ˆ ( ~ 2h c b b t S B − + + − υ   t − υ ~  
Cash user/ 
Marginal card user  t − υ ~   t − υ ~   t − υ ~  
Card user w/  B b  







+ + − υ
  c b b t S B − + + − ˆ ~ υ   Not applicable 
Merchant Total  t  t  t 
Network Total  4 / ) ˆ (
2h c b b S B − +   0  0 
Notes:  ) /( 1 B B b b h − = .  S b d ˆ ~ − − =υ υ . 
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Table 4: Consumer, Merchant, and Network Surplus: Discriminatory Pricing (Cont.) 
 
Type of merchants  Scenario II  
Type of network  Monopoly Network  No-Card  
Objective  Profit-max  Output-max 
Consumer homing  Singlehoming  Singlehoming 
Social Welfare  Higher than “No-Card”  Higher than “Monopoly, Profit-Max”  ) ˆ 1 /( ˆ
S S b d t b − − − υ  
Consumer Total  Higher than “No-Card”  Higher than “Monopoly, Profit-Max”  ) ˆ 1 /( S b d t − − − υ  
Cash user/ 
Marginal card user  Same as “No-card”  Same as “No-card”  ) ˆ 1 /( S b d t − − − υ  
Card user w/  B b   Higher than “No-Card” cash user  Higher than “No-Card” cash user and “Monopoly, 
Profit-Max”  Not applicable 
Merchant Total  Higher than “No-Card”  Higher than “Monopoly, Profit-Max”  t bS) ˆ 1 ( −  
Network Total  Higher than “No-Card”  0  0 
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Appendix A: Equilibrium Fee Structure 
1: No-Discriminatory Pricing  
Scenario I: Fixed Demand and Flat Costs and Fees 
When both Merchants A and B accept the cards, they earn the same profit of  2 / t . 
Furthermore, as long as each merchant takes the same strategy as its rival’s, each earns the same 
profit of  2 / t . 
Consider the highest merchant fee the monopoly card network can charge to the merchants. 
Suppose Merchant A accepts the cards but Merchant B does not. Each merchant’s profit is: 

















− − − − − + −
−
+ = π , 










S B B − + −
−
− = π , 
where  B b ˆ  is the average transactional benefit from cards among card-using consumers. When 
merchant fee is  f b b m B S − + > ˆ ˆ , Merchant B rejects the cards, given Merchant A accepts the 
cards. Given Merchant B rejects the cards, Merchant A rejects cards, too. When merchant fee is 
f b b m B S − + ≤ ˆ ˆ , Merchant B does not reject cards, given Merchant A accepts the cards. Thus, 
the highest merchant fee the monopoly card network can charge is: 
f b b m B S − + = ˆ ˆ .  
)) ( 1 )( ( f H c m f − − + = Π
Profit-maximizing monopoly network 
The profit-maximizing monopoly network solves the following problem: 
Max  , s.t.  f b b m B S − + ≤ ˆ ˆ . 
The equilibrium fee structure is:   28 
2
) ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ˆ S B
S B S
b c b
b f b b m
− −
+ = − + = , and 
S b c f ˆ − = . 
) ( 1 f H −
Output-maximizing monopoly network 
The output-maximizing monopoly network solves the following problem: 
Max  , s.t.  0 ≥ − + c m f  and  f b b m B S − + ≤ ˆ ˆ . 
When  S b c ˆ −  is large enough (i.e.,  2 / ) ( ˆ
B B S b b b c + ≥ − ), both constraints bind. The equilibrium 
fee structure is:  
) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b m S B S − + + = , and  
) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( c b b b c f S B S − + − − = .  
However, if  S b c ˆ −  is small (i.e.,  2 / ) ( ˆ
B B S b b b c + < − ), then the cardholder fee reaches the 
consumers’ lowest transactional benefit from cards before the budget constraint binds. The 







+ = , and 
B b f = .  
Suppose two competing card networks, Network 1 and Network 2, are symmetric in terms 
of their costs of processing card transactions and cardholder bases. The number of card 
transactions increases as the cardholder fee decreases.  Both networks reduce their markups to 
lower their card holder fees, which means their total fee revenues per transaction is reduced to 
their costs per transaction: 
Output-maximizing competitive networks with all multihoming cardholders 
c m f m f = + = + 2 2 1 1 . Suppose Network 1 sets the higher cardholder   29 
fee than Network 2 ( 2 1 f f > ). If both merchants accept Network 2’s card (Card 2), then 
consumers whose transactional benefit from cards exceeds  2 f  use Card 2 only. Merchants A and 
B earn the same profit of  2 / t . If Merchant A accepts both Cards 1 and 2 and Merchant B 
accepts Card 1 only, then their profits are:  
)}], )( 1 ( )
~










2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2
2




f f H f b H H b m H
m f m f
H






− − + − − − −
− − +
−
















2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
2




f f H b f H H b m H
m f m f
H






− + − − − − +
− − +
−









f H f H db b h b b B B
f
f B B − =∫ . By definition, 
2 1
~
f b f B > > . If Network 2 sets  S b m ˆ
2 =  and  S b c f ˆ
2 − = , rejecting Card 2 makes a merchant 
worse off, given the other merchant accepts Card 2. It is also true that if Network 1 sets  S b m ˆ
1 =  
and  S b c f ˆ
1 − = , accepting Card 2 makes a merchant worse off, given the other merchant rejects 
Card 2. The equilibrium fee structure is: 
S b m m ˆ
2 1 = = , 
S b c f f ˆ
2 1 − = = . 
Scenario II: Fixed Demand and Proportional Costs and Fees 
In contrast to the case where per transaction costs and fees are fixed, the Hotelling 
merchant’s profits are affected by the card fee structure and transactional benefit from cards, 
even when each merchant takes the same strategy as its rival’s. When both merchants reject 








And each earns profit 
0 π :  
2 0 ) ˆ 1 ( 2 t b t S − = π . 
When both merchants accept cards, each sets its price at: 
) 1 )( 1 )( ˆ 1 ( ) ˆ 1 (
)} 1 )( ˆ 1 ( { )} 1 )( 1 ( ) ˆ 1 {(
H m b f H b




− − − + + −
− − + + + − − + −
= , 
and each earns profit 
C π : 
) 1 )( ˆ )( 1 ( ) 1 )( ˆ ( ) ˆ 1 (
) 1 )( ˆ )( ˆ ( )} 1 )( ˆ ( ) ˆ 1 {(
2
2 2
H f b m H b m b
Htd H f b b m t H b m b
t
B S S
B S S S C
− − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − −
= π , 
where  ) ( f H H = . 
 Consider the highest merchant fee the monopoly card network can charge to the 
merchants. Suppose Merchant A accepts the cards but Merchant B does not. Each merchant sets 
its price at: 
)] ˆ 1 /( )} 1 )( ˆ )( ˆ 1 ( 2 ) 1 )( ˆ ( ) ˆ 1 ( 3 {
)} 1 )( ˆ ( 3 ) ˆ 1 ( 3 [{
1
S B S S S
S S A
b d H f b b H b m b
t H b m b
A
p
− − − − − − − − − +
− − − − =
 
)] ˆ 1 /(
} ) 1 ( ) ˆ )( ˆ 1 ( ) 1 )( ˆ )( ˆ 2 2 4 ( ) 1 )( ˆ ( 2 ) ˆ 1 ( 3 {





B S B S S S
B S B S S S B
b d
H f b b H f b b m H b m b




− − − + − − − − − − − − − +
− − − + − − − − − − − − − =
  
where  ). 1 )( ˆ )}( 1 )( ˆ ( ) ˆ 4 3 {( )} 1 )( ˆ ( ) ˆ 1 {( 3 H f b H b m b m H b m b A B S S S S − − − − + + − − − − − − =  And 
each merchant earns the following profit, respectively,: 
) 1 }( ) ˆ ( }{ ) 1 {( ) }( ) ˆ 1 {( 2 H p f b t p p d p m H t p p d p b t A B A B A A B A S A − − + + − − − + + − − − = π    31 
) 1 }( ) ˆ ( }{ ) ˆ 1 {( ) }( ) ˆ 1 {( 2 H p f b t p p d p b H t p p d p b t B B B A B S B A B S B − − − + − − − + + − − − = π  
It is difficult (if not impossible) to analytically obtain the highest merchant fee that 
monopoly card networks can charge. However, numerical examples suggest that the highest 
merchant fee is slightly less than the sum of the merchant’s transactional benefit and the average 
consumer’s net transactional benefit, i.e.,  f b b m B S − + ≅ ˆ ˆ .   
)) ( 1 )( ( f H c m f p − − + = Π
Profit-maximizing monopoly network 
The profit-maximizing monopoly network solves the following problem: 
Max  ,  
s.t.  m m ≤  and  
) 1 )( 1 )( ˆ 1 ( ) ˆ 1 (
)} 1 )( ˆ 1 ( { )} 1 )( 1 ( ) ˆ 1 {(
H m b f H b




− − − + + −
− − + + + − − + −
= . 
It is difficult to analytically solve the equilibrium fee structure; however, the numerical examples 
suggest that the equilibrium fee structure is: 
2
) ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ˆ S B
S B S
b c b
b f b b m m
− −
+ = − + ≅ = , and 
S b c f ˆ − ≅ . 
) ( 1 f H −
Output-maximizing monopoly network 
The output-maximizing monopoly network solves the following problem: 
Max  , s.t.  0 ≥ − + c m f  and  m m = . 
If  S b c ˆ −  is large enough (i.e.,  2 / ) ( ˆ
B B S b b b c + ≥ −  ), then two constraints bind. The equilibrium 
fee structure is:   
) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b m m S B S − + + ≅ = , and   32 
) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b c f S B S − + − − = . 
If  S b c ˆ −  is small (i.e.,  2 / ) ( ˆ
B B S b b b c + < −  ), then the cardholder fee reaches the consumers’ 
lowest transactional benefit from cards before the budget constraint binds. The equilibrium fee 







+ = , and 
B b f = .  
c m f m f = + = + 2 2 1 1
Output-maximizing competitive networks with all multihoming cardholders 
As discussed in Scenario I , two competing symmetric card networks reduce their markup 
to zero, i.e.,  . Suppose Network 1 sets the higher cardholder fee than 
Network 2 ( 2 1 f f > ), and Merchant A accepts both Cards 1 and 2 and Merchant B accepts Card 
1 only.  The equilibrium product prices in this case are:  
} ) 2 ( ) 2 {(
4
1
1 4 4 2 1 3 3 2
2 2 1 1
d L K L K t L K L K
L K L K
pA + + +
−
= , 
} ) 2 ( ) 2 {(
4
1
2 4 4 1 2 3 3 1
2 2 1 1
d L K L K t L K L K
L K L K






f B S db b h b m H b H f m K
B
) ( ) 1 ( ) ˆ 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 (
2
2 2 2 2 2 1 ∫ − − − + − + − = ; 
B B
b
f B S db b h b m H b H f m H m K
B
) ( ) 1 ( ) ˆ 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
1
2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 ∫ − − − + − − + − − = ; 
2 2 2 3 ) ˆ 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( H b H m K S − + − − = ; 
B B
b
f B db b h b H H f K
B
) ( ) 1 )( 1 (
2
2 2 2 4 ∫ − + − + = ;   33 
B B
b
f B S db b h b m H b H f m L
B
) ( ) 1 ( ) ˆ 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 (
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 ∫ − − − + − + − = ; 
; ) ( ) ˆ 1 (










f B S S
db b h b b





− − − + − − + − + − =
 
1 1 1 3 ) ˆ 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( H b H m L S − + − − = ; and 
B B
b
f B db b h b H H f L
B
) ( ) 1 )( 1 (
1
1 1 1 4 ∫ − + − + = . 
Since analytical solutions are difficult to obtain, we use numerical examples to examine the 
equilibrium. Suppose Network 2 sets its cardholder fee at  S b c f ˆ
2 − =  and Network 1 sets its 
cardholder fee slightly higher, i.e.,  ε + − = S b c f ˆ
1 , where 0 > ε . Merchant B’s profit is likely 
higher than the profit it would have accepted Card 2 and the profit it would have rejected both 
cards. Thus, given the rival merchant accepts Card 2, accepting Card 1 only is the most 
profitable than any other strategies, such as accepting Card 2 and rejecting both Cards 1 and 2.  
In contrast to Scenario I, Merchant A’s profit is also likely higher than that when both merchants 
accept Card 2. Thus, given the rival merchant accepts Card 1 only, accepting Card 2 is the most 
profitable strategy.   
In fact, Network 2’s number of card transactions is greater than Network 1’s. Knowing one 
of the two merchants accept Card 2, Network 2 has no incentive to reduce its merchant fee; 
rather, it would lower its cardholder fee further by raising its merchant fee.  Although Network 1 
would be able to make at least one merchant accept Card 1 only by reducing its merchant fee, it 
would have a smaller number of transactions than that when it sets the same merchant fee (thus 
cardholder fee) as Network 2’s. As a result, both networks have an incentive to reduce their 
cardholder fees and raise their merchant fees.  When the lowest transactional benefit for   34 
consumers is relatively high, both networks set their cardholder fees at the lowest transactional 









+ = = , and 
B b f f = = 2 1 .  
However, when the lowest transactional benefit for consumers is relatively low, the above 
would not be equilibrium fee structure. When both networks set their merchant fees high enough, 
Merchant B’s most profitable strategy changes from accepting Card 1 only to rejecting both 
cards. At those merchant fees, given Merchant B rejects both cards, Merchant A’s most 
profitable strategy is rejecting both cards. Thus, both networks may not set their merchant fees at 
such a high level. The threshold level of the merchant fees depends on other variables, but it is 
higher than the equilibrium merchant fee set by output-maximizing monopoly network.  
) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b m m S B S − + + > = , and 
) ˆ ( ˆ c b b b c f S B S − + − − < . 
Scenario III: Downward-Sloping Demand Curve and Flat Costs and Fees 
In contrast to the previous two scenarios, where consumers make a fixed number of 
purchases and thus transactions, it is difficult to obtain analytical solution when each consumer’s 
demand function is downward-sloping.  Even equilibrium product prices are difficult to obtain 
when two merchants take different strategies.  We are able to predict what the equilibrium fee 
structure looks like by making an additional assumption when cards are provided by monopoly 
networks; however, in order to predict the equilibrium fee structure when cards are provided by 
competing networks, we need to use more sophisticated simulation methods than just numerical   35 
examples used in this paper. Therefore, here we only examine the equilibrium fee structure when 
cards are provided by monopoly networks.  
We assume that if one of the two merchants rejects the cards, the card-rejecting merchant 
changes its product price, but the card-accepting merchant keeps its price at the same price level 
where both merchants accept the cards. The card-rejecting merchant’s profit derived under this 
assumption is likely higher than the profit when both merchants change their product price.  
Thus, the highest merchant fee the monopoly networks charge (m ) is likely lower than the 
highest merchant fee they charge (m ) when both merchants adjust their product prices.  As long 
as monopoly card networks set the merchant fee at m , both merchants accept the cards.  The 
product price they set is: 
tb H f b b p D
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Profit-maximizing monopoly network 
  
m m ≤     s.t.  and 
tb H f b b p D
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Numerical examples suggest that the equilibrium fee structure is:  
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) ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ˆ S B
S B S
b c b
b f b b m m
− −
+ = − + ≈ = , and 
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Output-maximizing monopoly network 
 ,  
m m ≤     s.t. ,  c m f ≥ + , and 
tb H f b b p D










+ − − +
+ − + − − + − − +
+ + =
) 1 )( ˆ ( ) (
} ) ˆ ( ) ( ){ 1 )( ˆ ( )} 1 )( ˆ ( ) ( { ˆ . 
Numerical examples suggest that it is quite likely to have corner solutions for this problem. 
When  m m =  and  c m f = + ,  S B b c b ˆ ˆ − ≅  . By definition,  B b f ˆ < , and thus the equilibrium 
cardholder fee is likely lower than the efficient cardholder fee. The merchant fee is higher than 
the efficient one, so is the product price. 
2. Discriminatory Pricing  
Scenario I: Fixed Demand and Flat Costs and Fees 
When both Merchants A and B accept the cards, they set the price for cash users at 
S
cash b d t p ˆ + + =  and the price for card users at  m d t p




B b m f b ˆ − + = . 
Notice that marginal card user is determined by the total fee, not by the fee structure.  It is easy 
to show that rejecting the cards always makes a merchant worse off, given the other merchant 
accepts the cards.  
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Profit-maximizing monopoly network 
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The equilibrium marginal card user and total fee are:   37 
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Output-maximizing monopoly and output-maximizing competing networks  
Since the total fee determines the marginal card user, the problems of output-maximizing 
networks become the same for monopoly and competing networks.  
Max  , s.t.  0 ≥ − + c m f . 
The equilibrium marginal card user and total card fee are:    
S
m
B b c b ˆ − = , and  
c m f = + . 
Scenario II: Fixed Demand and Proportional Costs and Fees 
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Notice that, unlike in the case of flat per transaction costs and fees, the card fee structure still 
affects the marginal card user.     38 
If Merchant A accepts the cards but Merchant B does not, then the marginal card user is 
determined by Merchant A’s product prices. While Merchant B has one price,  B p  for cash users, 
Merchant A has two prices: one for cash users: 
cash
A p  , and one for card users: 
card
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where  ) (
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B b H H = . The marginal card user is, therefore, defined as: 
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It is difficult to obtain the highest merchant fee that monopoly card networks can charge. 
Numerical examples suggest that the highest merchant fee is unlikely to exist. A merchant’s best 
strategy is likely to accepting the card regardless of its’ rival’s strategy and the merchant fee. In 
fact, as long as a merchant’s transactional benefit from a card is positive, the lower the merchant 
fees, the greater the output (i.e., more consumers use cards instead of using cash).  Therefore, 
output-maximizing monopoly network(s) would lower the merchant fee and raise the cardholder 
fee.  The lowest merchant fee the output-maximizing monopoly network could charge is the fee 
that makes all consumers use cards. Depending on the other factors, such as merchant 
transactional benefit from a card, card network’s costs of processing a transaction, consumers’ 
transactional benefits from a card, this lowest merchant fee could be unrealistically low.  (For   39 
example, when  S b ˆ =0.5%; c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t=10; and d =90,  m =-541%, or the 
merchant receives 541 percent of rewards on its product price for card using customers).  
Whether a profit-maximizing monopoly network would raise or lower the merchant fee 
depends on the factors mentioned above. According to numerical examples, for a reasonable 
range of the merchant fee (say from -10 percent to 10 percent), in some cases, the card network’s 
profit monotonically increases; in some cases, it monotonically decreases; and in other cases, it 
first decreases and then increases as the merchant fee increases. Generally, the higher the 
merchant fee, the lower the cardholder fee. Thus, the merchant fee set by a profit-maximizing 
monopoly network is either the highest or the lowest in the range.       
Scenario III: Downward-Sloping Demand Curve and Flat Costs and Fees 
Since it is extremely difficult to obtain analytical solution in this case, we will leave it for 
future research. 
 
Appendix B: Numerical Examples 
 
Scenario II: Fixed Demand and Proportional Costs and Fees 
 
1. No-Discriminatory Pricing  
 
The following parameter values are assumed: c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t=10; d =90, unless 
they are specifically mentioned.  
 
 
The maximum merchant fees that monopoly card networks can charge 
 
S b ˆ   0.5% 
f   -2%  -1%  0%  1%  2% 
m   2.49%  1.99%  1.49%  0.99%  0.5% 
f b b B S − + ˆ ˆ   2.5%  2%  1.5%  1%  0.5% 
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S b ˆ   1% 
f   -2%  -1%  0%  1%  2% 
m   2.98%  2.48%  1.99%  1.49%  1% 
f b b B S − + ˆ ˆ   3%  2.5%  2%  1.5%  1% 
 
S b ˆ   1.5% 
f   -2%  -1%  0%  1%  2% 
m   3.47%  2.98%  2.48%  1.99%  1.5% 





Profit-maximizing monopoly network 
 
  0.5%  1.5% 
f   0.49%  0.5%  0.51%  -0.51%  -0.5%  -0.49% 
m   1.252%  1.247%  1.242%  2.738%  2.734%  2.728% 
p   100.738  100.735  100.731  102.173  102.167  102.160 
H − 1   0.3775  0.375  0.3725  0.6275  0.625  0.6225 
Π   0.28217  0.28218  0.28217  0.7873  0.7880  0.7873 
 
S b ˆ
Output-maximizing monopoly network 
 
  0.5%  1%  1.5% 
f   -1%  -0.99%  -1.97%  -1.96%  -2% 
m   2%  1.99%  2.965%  2.96%  3% 
p   101.593  101.585  102.937  102.926  102.988 
H − 1   0.75  0.7475  0.9925  0.99  1 
Π   -0.0038  0  -0.0051  0  0 
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S b ˆ
Output-maximizing competing networks 
 
  0.5% 
  monopoly    Equilibrium     
1 f   -0.99%  -0.99%  -1.29%  -1.30%  -1.30% 
2 f   -0.99%  -1.00%  -1.30%  -1.30%  -1.31% 
Both merchants 
accept Card 2  
B π   4.973  4.973  4.966  4.966  4.966 
1 S   0.374  0  0  0.412  0 
2 S   0.374  0.75  0.824  0.412  0.828 
p   101.585  101.596  101.956  101.956  101.969 
Merchant A 
accepts Card 2 
Merchant B 
accepts Card 1 
only 
B π   4.973  5.017  5.011  4.966  5.011 
1 S   0.374  0.371  0.408  0.412  0.409 
2 S   0.374  0.378  0.416  0.412  0.417 
p ˆ   101.585  101.721  102.081  101.956  102.094 
Merchant A 
accepts Card 2 
Merchant B 
rejects both cards 
B π   4.973  4.974  5.011  5.011  5.013 
1 S   0  0  0  0  0 
2 S   0.748  0.75  0.824  0.824  0.828 
p ˆ   101.017  101.022  101.196  101.196  101.205 
 
S b ˆ   1.0% 
  monopoly    Equilibrium 
1 f   -1.96%  -1.96%  -1.998% 
2 f   -1.96%  -1.97%  -2.00% 
Both merchants 
accept Card 2  
B π   4.950  4.950  4.949 
1 S   0.495  0  0 
2 S   0.495  0.993  1 
p   102.926  102.941  102.988 
Merchant A 
accepts Card 2 
Merchant B 
accepts Card 1 
only 
B π   4.950  4.995  4.958 
1 S   0.495  0.491  0.499 
2 S   0.495  0.500  0.501 
p ˆ   102.926  103.067  103.113 
Merchant A 
accepts Card 2 
Merchant B 
rejects both cards 
B π   4.950  4.951  4.956 
1 S   0  0  0 
2 S   0.99  0.993  1 
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Equilibrium Fees and Welfares  
 
In the following table, the price, consumer surplus, merchant surplus, and social welfare in an 
economy without payment cards are used to calculate the percent change in price, consumer 
surplus, merchant surplus, and social welfare. 
 
S b ˆ =0.5%; c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  0.5  0.5  -0.99  -1.30 
Merchant fee rate (%)  0.5  1.25  1.99  2.30 
Network profit margin  0  0.75  0  0 
% change in Price  0.03  0.28  1.13  1.61 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.25  0.00  0.00  -0.24 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.28  -0.01  -0.05  1.11 
% change in Social Welfare  0.31  0.31  0.00  -0.14 
  S b ˆ =1%; c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  0  0  -1.96  -2.00 
Merchant fee rate (%)  1.0  1.99  2.96  3.00 
Network profit margin  0  0.99  0  0 
% change in Price  0.05  0.50  2.00  2.18 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.45  0.00  0.00  -0.15 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.29 
% change in Social Welfare  0.55  0.55  0.00  -0.02 
S b ˆ =1.5%; c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  -0.5  -0.5  -2.00  -2.00 
Merchant fee rate (%)  1.50  2.73  3.00  3.00 
Network profit margin  0  1.23  0  0 
% change in Price  0.08  0.79  1.60  1.60 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.70  0.00  0.44  0.44 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.79  -0.04  0.49  0.49 
% change in Social Welfare  0.86  0.86  0.54  0.54 
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S b ˆ =0.5%; c=0.5%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  0  0  -1.98  -2.00 
Merchant fee rate (%)  0.5  1.50  2.48  2.50 
Network profit margin  0  1.00  0  0 
% change in Price  0.05  0.5  2.02  2.17 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.45  0.00  0.00  -0.14 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.50  -0.03  0.00  1.29 
% change in Social Welfare  0.55  0.55  0.00  -0.01 
  S b ˆ =1%; c=0.5%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  -0.5  -0.5  -2.00  -2.00 
Merchant fee rate (%)  1.0  2.24  2.50  2.50 
Network profit margin  0  1.24  0  0 
% change in Price  0.08  0.79  1.59  1.59 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.70  0.00  0.44  0.44 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.79  -0.04  0.49  0.49 
% change in Social Welfare  0.87  0.86  0.55  0.55 
S b ˆ =1.5%; c=0.5%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  -1.00  -1.00  -2.00  -2.00 
Merchant fee rate (%)  1.50  1.98  2.50  2.50 
Network profit margin  0  1.48  0  0 
% change in Price  0.11  1.14  1.13  1.13 
% change in Consumer Surplus  1.01  0.00  0.90  0.90 
% change in Merchant Surplus  1.14  -0.05  1.00  1.00 
% change in Social Welfare  1.25  1.24  1.10  1.10 
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S b ˆ =0.5%; c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-1%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  0.50  0.50  -0.98  -1.00 
Merchant fee rate (%)  0.50  1.25  1.98  2.00 
Network profit margin  0  0.75  0  0 
% change in Price  0.04  0.38  1.50  1.70 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.34  0.00  0.00  -0.18 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.38  -0.01  0.00  1.72 
% change in Social Welfare  0.42  0.42  0.00  -0.01 
  S b ˆ =1%; c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-1%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  0.00  0.00  -1.00  -1.00 
Merchant fee rate (%)  1.00  1.99  2.00  2.00 
Network profit margin  0  0.99  0  0 
% change in Price  0.07  0.67  1.07  1.07 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.60  0.00  0.45  0.45 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.67  -0.02  0.50  0.50 
% change in Social Welfare  0.74  0.74  0.55  0.55 
S b ˆ =1.5%; c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-1%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  -0.50  -0.50  -1.00  -1.00 
Merchant fee rate (%)  1.50  2.73  2.00  2.00 
Network profit margin  0  1.23  0  0 
% change in Price  0.10  1.05  0.61  0.61 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.94  0.00  0.90  0.90 
% change in Merchant Surplus  1.05  -0.02  1.01  1.01 
% change in Social Welfare  1.15  1.15  1.10  1.10 
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S b ˆ =0.5%; c=0.5%;  B b =1%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  0.50  0.50  0.00  -0.59 
Merchant fee rate (%)  0.50  0.74  1.00  1.59 
Network profit margin  0  0.24  0  0 
% change in Price  0.00  0.04  0.17  0.73 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.31 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.04  0.00  -0.01  1.50 
% change in Social Welfare  0.05  0.05  0.00  -0.18 
  S b ˆ =1%; c=0.5%;  B b =1%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  0  0  -0.98  -1.38 
Merchant fee rate (%)  1.00  1.50  1.98  2.38 
Network profit margin  0  0.50  0  0 
% change in Price  0.02  0.17  0.66  1.26 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.15  0.00  0.00  -0.31 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.17  -0.01  -0.02  1.51 
% change in Social Welfare  0.18  0.18  0.00  -0.18 
S b ˆ =1.5%; c=0.5%;  B b =1%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 






Cardholder fee rate (%)  -0.50  -0.50  -1.96  -2.00 
Merchant fee rate (%)  1.50  2.24  2.96  3.00 
Network profit margin  0  0.74  0  0 
% change in Price  0.04  0.38  1.48  1.71 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.34  0.00  0.00  -0.19 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.38  -0.02  0.00  1.70 
% change in Social Welfare  0.41  0.41  0.00  -0.03 
 
2. Discriminatory Pricing  
 
We assume the following parameter values: c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t=10; d =90. We also 




Profit-maximizing monopoly network 
 
  0.5% 
m   -10%  -1%  0%  1%  10% 
f   11.78%  2.75%  1.75%  0.75%  -8.27% 
card p   90.897  98.999  99.989  101.000  111.102 
H − 1   0.184  0.179  0.178  0.177  0.172 
Π   0.130  0.133  0.134  0.134  0.139 
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S b ˆ   1% 
m   -10%  -1%  0%  1%  10% 
f   12.06%  3.01%  2.00%  1.00%  -8.05% 
card p   90.863  98.962  99.952  100.962  111.061 
H − 1   0.249  0.239  0.239  0.237  0.227 
Π   0.2398  0.239  0.239  0.239  0.2397 
 
S b ˆ   1.5% 
m   -10%  -1%  0%  1%  10% 
f   12.34%  3.27%  2.26%  1.25%  -7.81% 
card p   90.830  98.925  99.915  100.924  111.019 
H − 1   0.317  0.300  0.299  0.297  0.280 




Output-maximizing monopoly network 
 
  0.5% 
m   -541%  -10%  0%  10% 
f   542%  11%  1%  -9% 
card p   15.598  90.931  100.029  111.150 
H − 1   1.000  0.368  0.356  0.344 
 
S b ˆ   1% 
m   -218.9%  -10%  0%  10% 
f   219.9%  11%  1%  -9% 
card p   31.348  90.909  100.005  111.123 
H − 1   1.000  0.500  0.476  0.452 
 
S b ˆ   1.5% 
m   -111.5%  -10%  0%  10% 
f   112.5%  11%  1%  -9% 
card p   47.259  90.887  99.981  111.096 
H − 1   1.000  0.634  0.598  0.561 
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Welfares  
 
S b ˆ =0.5%; c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 




Cardholder fee rate (%)  -8.27  11 
Merchant fee rate (%)  10  -10 
Network profit margin  0.73  0 
% change in Price  10.60  -9.48 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.07  0.24 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.07  0.27 
% change in Social Welfare  0.23  0.30 
  S b ˆ =1%; c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 




Cardholder fee rate (%)  12.06  11 
Merchant fee rate (%)  -10  -10 
Network profit margin  1.06  0 
% change in Price  -9.96  -9.91 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.11  0.45 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.12  0.51 
% change in Social Welfare  0.40  0.55 
S b ˆ =1.5%; c=1%;  B b =2%;  B b =-2%; t =10; d =90 




Cardholder fee rate (%)  12.34  11 
Merchant fee rate (%)  -10  -10 
Network profit margin  1.34  0 
% change in Price  -10.40  -10.34 
% change in Consumer Surplus  0.18  0.72 
% change in Merchant Surplus  0.20  0.81 
% change in Social Welfare  0.64  0.88 
 
 
 
 